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The legal mind rarely, if ever, resists the temptation to make things
appear to be neater, tidier and, above all, more logical than in truth
they are, have been or ever will be. Perhaps it is our function, as
scholars, judges, even as practitioners, to spend our lives making sense
out of nonsense, reducing real chaos to apparent order, finding patterns
in the formless waste and imposing our own brand of rationality on the
irrational and the absurd. Perhaps it is even a useful function.
The history and current state of American maritime law and of the
jurisdiction of the federal courts sitting "in admiralty" make up a story
which might have furnished excellent material to the authors of
H.M.S. Pinafore. There is an engaging idiocy in the story line as it
unfolds which reassures us as to its essential truth: no one would have
had the wit to invent anything on this level of fantasy. The mind indeed
boggles at the contemplation of such constructs as the maritime lien
unknown to the maritime law, created by a state statute, which cannot,
however, be enforced in the state courts but can be enforced only in
the federal courts on the admiralty "side."'
The idea that the law applicable to a national industry such as
shipping should be federal law, nationally uniform, makes a great deal
of sense. If the framers of the Constitution and the draftsmen of the
Judiciary Act of 1789 had provided that maritime law was to be a
federal specialty administered exclusively by federal admiralty courts,
we would have no difficulty understanding what they had done and why
they had done it. No doubt, if shipping had been so handled in the
late eighteenth century, the problems of transportation by rail in the
nineteenth century and by road and air in our own century would from
the beginning have been looked on as federal law problems and as
federal specialties. What the eighteenth century artisans of our legal and
t Harry A. Bigelow Professor of Law, The University of Chicago.
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political system in fact did with shipping and its law left the relationship between state and federal law, as well as the relationship between
the state and federal court systems, in a state of utter confusion and
impenetrable mystery. "The judicial Power [of the United States],"
said the Constitution,2 "shall extend.., to all Cases of admiralty and
maritime Jurisdiction ... ." "[T]he [federal] district courts," said the
Judiciary Act of 1789, 3 ".. shall also have exclusive original cognizance
of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction... saving to
suitors, in all cases, the right of a common law remedy, where the
common law is competent to give it.... ." Fitting some kind of meaning
to these essentially meaningless provisions has been part of the business
of the Supreme Court of the United States for nearly two hundred
years. Since the mid-1940's, the Court has devoted an inordinate
amount of its time and energy to the resolution of these mysteries, with
results which have occasionally been such as to make the observer
despair of the judicial process itself.4 During this period the Court has
been split, violently and bitterly, between factions which, with a great
deal of oversimplification, can be referred to as the "federal supremacy"
faction (whose spokesman in many of the cases was Justice Black) and
the "states rights" faction (for which Justice Frankfurter, during his
tenure on the Court, often spoke). Occasionally the two factions seem,
mysteriously, to exchange positions. There are perhaps indications that
the current Court, because of changes in membership or simply because
of exhaustion after a quarter of a century of in-fighting, is preparing to
drop its long-standing affair with the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.6
In his Admiralty and Federalism Professor Robertson addresses himself to the federal-state problem, both in its historical development and
in the light of the Supreme Court's mid-twentieth century revolution.
It may be that Professor Robertson, like the rest of us,6 makes more
sense of his subject than is really there. However, it is eminently helpful
to have the scattered bits and pieces of the jigsaw put back together by
so competent and knowledgeable a puzzle-solver.
Professor Robertson's book is about half history and half current
events. In his first two chapters he explores what is known of the backU.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
3 Ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 77.
4 See, e.g., Currie, Federalism and the Admiralty: The Devil's Own Mess, 1960 Sup. CT.
2

REv. 158.
5 See, e.g., Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970), discussed briefly

at the end of this review.
6 See, e.g., G. GILMORE & C. BLAcK, Tin LAW OF ADmIRALTY (1957), passim, to say nothing
of this review.
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ground of the constitutional grant and the jurisdictional provision of
the Judiciary Act of 1789. Most discussion of these matters has contented itself with a few well-known secondary sources, with each
generation of commentators repeating what the previous generation had
said. Professor Robertson has gone back to wrestle with the primary
sources, for which he is entitled to much credit. What emerges from his
discussion is that precious little is known, or ever will be known, about
either the constitutional grant or the jurisdictional provision. We know
neither how they came to be drafted the way they were nor, having
been so drafted, what they were meant to mean. Professor Robertson
would no doubt have been happy if his historical researches had turned
up something more dramatic. For the rest of us it is most helpful to
know how unhelpful the sources are. Perhaps the unresolved tensions
and conflicts of the 1780's led both the constitutional and legislative
draftsmen to the conclusion that the part of wisdom was to talk in
riddling terms of the "admiralty and maritime jurisdiction," leaving to
later generations the task of working out a solution in the light of
whatever social, economic and political realities might have come to
pass.
There follows a chapter which recounts the well-known story of the
loss by the English admiralty courts during the seventeenth century of
their once extensive jurisdiction. It is hard to see what this material
adds to Professor Robertson's argument. Two more chapters trace the
jurisdiction of the vice-admiralty courts during the colonial period and
of their successors during the period of the Revolution and of the
Confederation. This material is historically relevant since one of the
reasons, first put forward by Justice Story,7 for taking an expansive view
of the constitutional grant of "admiralty and maritime jurisdiction"
was the argument that the vice-admiralty courts and their successors had
exercised a jurisdiction much broader than that of the admiralty courts
in England after the seventeenth century. However, except from an
antiquarian point of view, it really makes little difference whether Story
was right or wrong. And, indeed, since the surviving court records are
scattered, incomplete, illegible and confused, we shall never know the
truth of the matter anyhow.
Returning, after these digressions, to the history of federalism, Professor Robertson devotes a series of four chapters to the nineteenth
century developments, both as to jurisdiction, exclusive or concurrent,
and as to the substantive rules of maritime law. This is excellent stuffan interesting story well told. Professor Robertson's discussion, I am
happy to note, seems to be consistent with what has become my own
7
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hobbyhorse with respect to the commercial law of the period: that is,
that, to an astonishing degree, national uniformity in the law was in fact
achieved and maintained over a long period of time. This was done
under the superintendence of the Supreme Court of the United States,
in its self-appointed role as announcer of the general federal commercial
law under the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson" (or, in the maritime field, as
the only true interpreter of the constitutional grant of "admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction"). However, during this period the Supreme
Court rarely, if ever, described what it was doing as "fashioning a
federal rule." A currently controversial question would be referred to
the Court. The Court would propose its own best synthesis of conflicting views. Not always but in a surprising number of cases the Supreme
Court's synthesis proved acceptable to everyone. The state courts followed the Supreme Court, not because they were bound to do so but
because what the Court did usually made a great deal of sense and, in
any event, the obviously desirable goal of national uniformity could
be achieved only in this fashion. 9 Theoretically, any number of conflicts
could have arisen between the two independent court systems. In fact
almost no conflicts ever did arise-whether in the Swift v. Tyson area
of general commercial law or in the constitutionally protected area of
"admiralty and maritime jurisdiction." Theoretically, it has often been
said, if a plaintiff with a maritime cause of action elected, under what
came to be the received meaning of the "saving to suitors" clause, to
bring his action in a common law court and if the common law court
had a rule of substantive law inconsistent with a rule of maritime law,
the common law court would apply its own common law rule. Almost
the only case which is ever cited to illustrate the propositon is Belden v.
Chase,10 a collision case in which the New York Court of Appeals was
upheld in applying the common law contributory negligence rule in
lieu of the maritime divided damages rule. A proposition which is
supported by the ritual citation of a single case is at best a doubtful
proposition. Perhaps some industrious researcher will look into the
matter and discover that throughout the nineteenth century the common law courts were following the Supreme Court's lead in the maritime cases as they were in the commercial law cases. At least that is my
hunch and nothing that Professor Robertson has turned up seems
inconsistent with it.
The balance of Professor Robertson's book (Chapters X-XVI) is
8 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
9 For an example of this process, in the context of railroad and industrial equipment
financing, see 2 G. GILMoRE, SECURITY INTERESTS iN PERSONAL PROPERTY 743-76 (1965).
10 150 U.S. 674 (1893).
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devoted to current events, or, more precisely, to the story of the twentieth century controversy about what has often been referred to as the
doctrine of the supremacy of federal maritime law. That is, that a
common law court in adjudicating a maritime cause of action, plaintiff
having elected to sue outside the admiralty under the saving to suitors
clause, should, at least in some types of cases and in some situations,
apply maritime law, not common law. After twenty-five years of almost
continual litigation, the Supreme Court has not succeeded in making
clear what types of cases the doctrine applies to or under what circumstances the doctrine applies or even if there is such a doctrine as
distinguished from a controversy about the doctrine. It may be that the
Supreme Court will never make these things clear and that the controversy will be allowed to die down or fade away without the issues which
initially prompted it ever having been settled one way or the other.
Professor Robertson accepts the reconstruction under which the Supreme Court set the stage for the great controversy in Southern Pacific
Co. v. Jensen" and Chelentisv. Luckenbach S.S. Co.12 Then there was a
twenty-five year stage-wait before the curtain went up. Finally, shortly
after the Erie case had apparently committed the Court to a broad view
of state law supremacy the Court began experimenting with the reverse
idea of federal law supremacy in maritime matters. Garrett v. MooreMcCormack Co.13 seems to have been one of the first cases of this type.
A few years after Garrett the Supreme Court converted the traditional
maritime law remedy for unseaworthiness into "a species of liability
without fault.., a form of absolute duty owing to all within the range
of its humanitarian policy" and extended the remedy to harborworkers
(as well as to seamen in the primitive sense). 14 A host of plaintiffs and
their counsel enthusiastically accepted the invitation to carry out the
humanitarian policy of the maritime doctrine of absolute liability for
unseaworthiness in actions brought in common law courts conveniently
equipped with juries.
Professor Robertson successively reviews the Court's efforts to work
out the "federal law supremacy" problem in the context of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (Chapter XII), in
11 244 U.S. 205 (1917) (New York Workmen's Compensation statute unconstitutional as
applied to harbor worker killed on navigable waters).
12 247 U.S. 372 (1918) (in seaman's personal injury action brought in common law court
on theory of negligence, maritime law rule which allows seaman to recover indemnity for
unseaworthiness but not for negligence applies so that the action does not lie).
13 317 U.S. 239 (1942) (maritime rule on burden of proof as to invalidation of release
executed by seaman, not contrary Pennsylvania common law rule, applies in personal
injury action under Jones Act brought by injured seaman in Pennsylvania court).
14 Both these results were achieved in Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946).
The quotations are from id. at 94-95.
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actions for wrongful death (Chapter XIII), and in actions for personal
injury (Chapter XIV). On the whole he seems to give the Supreme
Court higher marks than most other commentators have given or than
I would be inclined to give. Professor Robertson is perhaps the first
person to defend not only the policy of the majority's decision in
Calbeck v. Travelers Insurance Co.15 but the semantics and logical
structure of Justice Brennan's opinion as well;16 the Brennan opinion

is analyzed and approved at length both in the text of the treatise and in
an Appendix which originally appeared in that interesting periodical,
1
Modern Uses of Logic in Law (M.U.L.L.).Y
Professor Robertson credits the Court, or some of its members, with
what he calls an "interest balancing analysis."'u That is, with respect to
the choice of state or federal law in a maritime case, the proper approach
is to weigh the federal or national interest against the state or local
interest. If the national interest outweighs the local interest, then (per
Jensen) the federal rule of maritime law should prevail. Contrariwise,
if the local interest outweighs the national interest, then (under the socalled "maritime but local" "exception" to Jensen) the state common
law (or statutory) rule should prevail. Professor Robertson seems to
feel that this is a good approach and that, if the majority of the Court
would consistently adhere to it, a satisfactory state of law would soon
develop. My own trouble with this theory is that I have no idea how to
go about balancing national interests against local interests, I doubt
that Professor Robertson knows how to go about it, and I am not even
convinced that a majority of the justices of the Supreme Court knows
how to go about it. (For example, a majority of the Court held, in 1917,
that the national interest so outweighed the local interest with respect
to Jensen's death that the New York Workmen's Compensation Act
could not be constitutionally applied to afford Jensen's widow the
15 370 U.S. 114 (1962).
16 Section 3(a) of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act of 1927
§ 3(a), ch. 509, § 3(a), 44 Stat. 1424 (1927), as amended 33 U.S.C. § 903(a) (1964), provided
in substance that disability and death payments under the Act could be made only with
respect to accidents which occurred on navigable waters of the United States and, furthermore, "if recovery for the disability or death through workmen's compensation proceedings may not validly be provided by State law." The pre-Calbeck commentary, which
was extensive, assumed without exception that the "may not validly be provided" language
incorporated the so-called "maritime but local" "exception" to the Jensen doctrine of
maritime law supremacy (Professor Robertson collects the authorities at p. 213 n.45). Justice
Brennan's Calbeck opinion (which Justice Stewart, dissenting, 370 U.S. at 132, referred
to as "judicial legerdemain") said that "may not validly be provided" did not incorporate
"maritime but local," with, apparently, the result that the only condition to recovery
under the federal Act is that the accident took place on navigable waters. 370 U.S. at 126.
-7 P. 214 n.53.
18 Pp. 195 et seq.
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statutory remedy which the Act provided. Why? Or, for that matter,
why not?)
Professor Robertson cites, as one of the Court's most successful applications of the "interest balancing analysis," Kossick v. United Fruit
Co.,19 majority opinion by Justice Harlan, dissents by Justice Frankfurter (joined by Justice Stewart) and by Justice Whittaker. Kossick
alleged that the defendant, his employer, had orally agreed that if Kossick
accepted treatment at a United States Public Health Hospital for a
disease contracted while Kossick was employed on one of defendant's
ships the defendant would indemnify Kossick for any further injury he
might suffer as the result of negligent or incompetent treatment at the
hospital. Relying on this agreement, Kossick entered the hospital,
received negligent or incompetent treatment, and was further injured.
Kossick brought his action under the saving to suitors clause in federal
court on the civil side, federal jurisdiction being grounded on diversity
of citizenship. The district court 20 and the Second Circuit 2 ' ruled
against Kossick on the ground that the alleged "contract," even if made,
was unenforceable under the New York Statute of Frauds. In the
Supreme Court a six-man majority reversed on the ground that maritime law under which oral contracts are enforceable should prevail over
the assumed New York rule under the local Statute of Frauds. Justice
Harlan's majority opinion said that the determination whether the
federal maritime rule or the state rule should govern in a case like
Kossick's is one of "accommodation"-- or "interest balancing" in
Professor Robertson's phrase. Having weighed the interests and perhaps
the equities, Justice Harlan concluded that in Kossick's case the national or maritime elements outweighed the local elements so that the
lower courts had been in error in applying the New York Statute of
Frauds. "In summary," Professor Robertson writes at the end of a long
and approving discussion of the Harlan opinion, "the Kossick case is a
classic application of the reverse-Erie interest-balancing process ... "22
So far, so good. One can agree or disagree (as three of his colleagues
did) with the way in which Justice Harlan juggled his weights and
balances. However, there seems to have been more to the case than has
so far appeared. According to the two lower court opinions, Kossick could
not have brought an action in admiralty because his admiralty action
would have been time-barred. 23 He therefore brought his "common19 365 U.S. 731 (1961).
20 166 F. Supp.'571 (SM..N.Y. 1958).
21 275 F.2d 500 (2d Cir. 1960).
22

P. 257.

23 166 F. Supp. at 573; 275 F.2d at 501. The assumed time-bar was the three-year statute
of limitations under the Jones Act. I do not myself understand why Kossick's action if
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law" action in order to get the benefit of the New York contract statute
of limitations which had not yet run. It seems not unreasonable to
conclude that the lower courts felt that if Kossick wanted the benefit of
the state statute of limitations, he also had to carry the burden of the
state Statute of Frauds. (Alternatively, they could have ruled against
Kossick on the ground that the maritime rules applied to his common
law action, so that he was still time-barred.) The only reference Justice
Harlan makes to the admiralty time-bar is the off-hand comment, "A
different conclusion should not be reached... because of any suspicion
that this complaint may have been contrived to serve ulterior purposes"
(citing the passages of the lower court opinions which had stated that
the admiralty action was time-barred). 24 (Curiously, neither of the dissenting opinions mentions the point.) Thus Justice Harlan apparently
accepted the conclusion that the three-year Jones Act statute of limitations would have applied to Kossick's action, had he brought it in
admiralty, but that, for some reason, his common law action is to be
looked on as an action for breach of contract subject to the state contract
statute of limitations but, because the contract allegedly breached was a
"maritime" contract, not subject to the state Statute of Frauds. If this is,
as Professor Robertson puts it, "a classic application of the reverse-Erie
interest-balancing process," the process is far too subtle for my poor wits.
Another approach to Kossick might be to say that it stands for the
proposition that a maritime plaintiff who brings a common law action
may, when confronted with inconsistent federal maritime and state
common law (or statutory) rules, choose whichever rule is more favorable to his recovery-thus in Kossick's case he may choose the maritime
rule on the enforceability of oral contracts along with the applicable
state statute of limitations. We shall return to this possible explanation
presently.
Professor Robertson in his chapters on "The Amphibious Worker"
(XII), "Wrongful Death" (XIII), and "Personal Injury" (XIV) stresses
the consistency with which the Court, particularly in recent years, has
followed the "interest-balancing" analysis. The chief stumbling block
in his way is the 1947 case of Caldarola v. Eckert,25 which, after a
lengthy discussion, he disposes of on the ground that "arguably" the
contract involved in Caldarola was non-maritime. The contract in
brought in admiralty would have been looked on as a Jones Act action or why, if that is
assumed, his action outside the admiralty ceases to be a Jones Act action. Nevertheless,
not only does the district court say this and the Second Circuit repeat it, but Justice
Harlan (see text at note 24 infra) seems to assume that it is true. Rightly or wrongly,
therefore, the admiralty time-bar is in the case.
24 365 U.S. at 742.
25 332 U.S. 155 (1947).
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question was the so-called "General Agency" agreement under which,
during World War II, private shipping lines operated governmentowned vessels as "general agents" of the United States. The closest
analogy to the General Agency agreement would seem to be some kind
of charter-party, which, everyone would agree, would be "maritime."
On the whole, Professor Robertson's suggested Caldarola distinction
does not persuade me. Closer to the mark, I should think, would be a
recognition that the Supreme Court cases from the 1940's through the
1960's simply cannot all be arranged in a logically consistent pattern.
Most of the time the Court split five to four. The majority was shifting
and unstable. Occasionally (as perhaps in Caldarola) the group which
was usually in the minority picked up an extra vote and was able to
announce "the opinion of the Court." And the group which was usually
in the majority seems never to have been firmly enough in control flatly
to overrule such uncomfortable precedents as Caldarola.
Professor Robertson segregates for discussion in his next-to-last
chapter a group of three "Miscellaneous Cases" which, he says, "are
perhaps slightly less amenable to the interest-balancing analysis suggested than Kossick and the recent personal injury cases." 26 In Levinson
v. Deupree27 it was held that, in an action brought by an administrator
of an estate for wrongful death, the federal court sitting in admiralty was
not bound by all the "procedural niceties" of state law. The "procedural
niceties" would have required the action to be dismissed. The opinion
was by Justice Frankfurter for a unanimous Court-one of the few
admiralty cases through the entire period from which there was no
dissent. In Maryland Casualty Co. v. Cushing28 four justices (in an
opinion by Justice Frankfurter) thought that the policy of the federal
Limited Liability Act required that wrongful death actions brought
against a shipowner's casualty insurer, under a Louisiana statute providing for "direct actions" against such insurers, should, the shipowner
having petitioned for limitation of liability, be dismissed. Four other
justices (in an opinion by Justice Black) thought that the "direct
actions" should be allowed to proceed, despite the pendency of the
limitation proceeding. Justice Clark thought that the "direct actions,"
instead of being dismissed, should be stayed until the conclusion of the
limitation proceeding and then allowed to proceed. If the Court had
divided four to four, the result, by letting stand the disposition of the
case in the Circuit Court of Appeals, would have been the one for which
the Black group argued. The Frankfurter group therefore reluctantly
26 P. 253.
27 345 U.S. 648 (1953).
28 347 U.S. 409 (1954).
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joined Justice Clark to provide a majority for reversal. In Wilburn Boat
Co. v. Fireman'sFund Insurance Co.2 9 it appeared that a houseboat on
Lake Texoma (a landlocked artificial lake between Texas and Oklahoma) had been destroyed by fire and also that certain "warranties" in
the insurance policy which covered the houseboat had been breached.
The breaches of warranty, it was found, were not causally connected
with the destruction of the boat. A Texas statute allowed recovery
against insurers, despite the breach of warranties, unless it appeared that
the breach was causally connected with the loss. Justice Black, speaking
for a majority of six, said in effect that there was no rule of maritime law
on this issue, that the Court declined to "fashion" such a rule and that,
under these circumstances, there was no reason why the Texas statute
should not apply. Justices Reed and Burton dissented and so in effect
did Justice Frankfurter although he chose to label his separate opinion
a concurrence.
I do not entirely understand why Professor Robertson's three "Miscellaneous Cases" do not fit into the interest-balancing analysis, but that
may be because I do not understand interest-balancing. I suggested
earlier that it is possible to take the Kossick case as standing for the
proposition that plaintiff, faced with inconsistent federal and state rules,
gets the best of both worlds. Our three Miscellaneous Cases seem to
dovetail -nicely with that explanation of Kossick. In Levinson the
admiralty court was directed to disregard "procedural niceties" of state
law which would have barred plaintiff's recovery. In Gushing the plaintiffs in the wrongful death action were allowed to bring direct actions
against the insurer under the state statute-not, it is true, immediately
(as four members of the Court thought they should be able to do) but
at least as soon as the limitation proceeding should be concluded. In
Wilburn Boat plaintiff recovered against the insurer under the state
statute even though (as Justice Black put it) there was no established rule
of maritime law covering the case or (as everyone else who has written
about the case has put it) there was a long established rule of maritime
law under which plaintiff could not recover. The principal case which
does not fit into this or any other schematic analysis which has so far
been proposed is Caldarolav. Eckert, previously discussed, in which the
New York Court of Appeals was allowed to apply a rule of state law
which was fatal to plaintiff's recovery. But if Caldarola represents the
Court's one serious fall from grace-that is, from consistency-in a
quarter of a century, it has done extremely well.
Is there anything to be said for the proposition which I have attributed to the Court in the bulk of its cases since 1940? The proposition
29 348 U.S. 310 (1954).
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is that plaintiff's recovery will be favored and that defenses available
either under maritime law or under common law will be cut back if not
abolished and that, as between a common law rule and a maritime rule,
plaintiff may elect whichever is more favorable to his case. So put, the
proposition seems offensive to our ideas of evenhanded justice. The law
is no respecter of persons; this is a government not of men but of laws
(or, as it is sometimes put, not of laws but of lawyers); it is not only
true but right that both rich men and poor men are forbidden to sleep
under bridges. However that may be, it can be argued that the most
notable feature of our law of civil obligations, alike in contract and in
tort, during the past quarter of a century or so has been a dramatic
expansion of liability for the consequences of social action. What has
been going on within the esoteric confines of the "admiralty and maritime jurisdiction" is very much of a piece with what has been going on
across the waterfront. In converting the maritime remedy for unseaworthiness into "a species of liability without fault" in the 1940's the
Supreme Court was merely a few years ahead of the state courts which,
in the 1950's, converted the manufacturer's liability toward users of
his defective products into the same sort of strict or no-fault liability.30
And the extension of the unseaworthiness remedy to harbor workers
may be thought to parallel the development in the "products liability"
cases under which remote users of a product may bring actions directly
against the manufacturers, in tort, thus bypassing the once powerful
defenses of "no privity of contract" or "disclaimer of warranty." A
hundred years ago our law of civil obligations seems to have been dedicated to the proposition that, ideally, no one should be liable to anyone
for anything. Today plaintiffs who have been disappointed in their
contractual expectations or who have suffered financial loss or personal
injury find themselves traveling a broad, well-paved highway which
leads smoothly to the happy hunting ground of damage recoveries
generously calculated by sympathetic juries.
There are, of course, those-particularly among our brethren in the
field of economics 1-who deplore these developments and still yearn
for the good old ways of the good old days. Nevertheless it is obvious
that there has been a reversal in the allocation of risks which seemed to
make sense fifty or seventy-five years ago. It may be of some intellectual
comfort to us that, at least arguably, the Supreme Court, in carrying
30 On these developments, see Symposium-Products Liability: Economic Analysis and
the Law, 88 U. CH. L. REv. 1 (1970). For my own views, see id. at 103. In addition to
the Chicago symposium, there has been a flood of writing on the "products liability"
developments over the past ten years or so.
31 See, e.g., McKean, Products Liability: Trends and Implications, the principal article
in Symposium, supra note 30, at 3.
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out its constitutional mandate of declaring "the admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction," has been, perhaps obscurely, responding to the same
forces which have led our courts generally, during the period since
World War II, to preside over an astonishing expansion of our theories
of civil liability. Exactly what those forces were escapes our contemporary vision; a later generation of historians will solve our puzzles and
unriddle our riddles. But I do think that it is possible and helpful to
set the problem of what has been going on in the admiralty since the
1940's in the context of the law of civil obligations generally rather than
in the narrower context of maritime law itself.
Professor Robertson concludes his book with the suggestion that in
the future a greater role should be played both by state rules of substantive law and by the state courts themselves. He picks up a suggestion
put forward by Professor Charles Black in 195032 which was that all
maritime personal injury litigation should be handled by the state
courts, with the federal admiralty courts retaining an exclusive jurisdiction over "contractual, commercial and property adjustment." "Admiralty and maritime jurisdiction," Professor Robertson comments,
"will, it seems clear, eventually become a relatively minor independent
ground of federal jurisdiction. . . . Conceptualistic, quasi-religious
regard for the sanctity and separateness of the maritime law ought
correspondingly to wither.... Much of the substantive law applicable
in maritime cases could be state law without doing undue damage to
general or specific uniformity interests .... [T]here is every reason to
afford as wide a scope as practicable to state competence in private law
matters."33
These are all arguable, and interesting, points. My own thought is
that our course is probably set in the opposite direction and that there
is to be an increasing federalization of our private law generally (including our maritime law). So far as the maritime law itself is concerned,
the Supreme Court's most recent notable pronouncement in Moragne
v. States Marine Lines, Inc.3 4 (decided after Professor Robertson's book
had gone to press) suggests an expansive rather than a restrictive approach to admiralty and maritime questions. In Moragne the Court was
finally scrambling out of the dreadful pit it dug for itself in the
infamous series of cases beginning with The Tungus v. Skovgaard.3 5 It is
32 Black, Admiralty Jurisdiction:Critique and Suggestions, 50 CoL.mr. L. REv. 259 (1950).
33 P. 283.
34 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
35 858 U.S. 588 (1959). Professor Robertson discusses the Tungus series in his chapter on

recovery for wrongful death (Chapter XIII). The issue was the degree to which state wrongful death statutes were to be "borrowed" to give a cause of action for wrongful death
in the light of the holding in The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199 (1886), that there was no
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interesting to note, however, that the solution to the Tungus disaster
was a federal law solution and that in Moragne, for what may have been
the first time in many years, the Court was unanimous in a major
admiralty decision. Moragne, it seems to me, is the most hopeful sign
we have yet had that the long controversy is nearing its end-or has
perhaps ended. 36 Professor Robertson's current events, it may be, have
already become history.
action for wrongful death under maritime law. The Moragne case overruled The Harrisburg, created or "fashioned" a wrongful death cause of action under maritime law and
thus abolished the problem which had led the Court to such acrimonious dispute in the
Tungus series.
36 Another hopeful sign, of somewhat earlier vintage, may have been Fitzgerald v.
United States Lines Co., 374 U.S. 16 (1963), in which the Court unexpectedly laid to rest
the awful complexities which had been revealed in Romero v. International Terminal
Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959).

